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On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Biologics 
Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA) as part of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”). The purpose of 
BPCIA was to create for biologics a regime similar to that of the Drug 
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (Hatch–Waxman 
Act) and, in so doing, to open biologics markets to competition and, 
subsequently, lower the price of these expensive and increasingly 
important pharmaceuticals. Using original data, this Essay takes 
stock of the decade that has passed since the enactment of BPCIA. This 
Essay surveys the state of competition in United States biologics 
markets, entry of follow-on biologics into these markets, and the 
effects such entry has had on biologics prices.   
This Essay’s main findings are that, as of March 23, 2020—exactly 
ten years since the signing of BPCIA into law—the FDA has approved 
a total of 26 follow-on biologics deemed biosimilar to 9 original 
products (ratio: 2.63 follow-on/original products), with only 16 of 
these deemed biosimilar to 7 original products (ratio: 1.78 follow-
on/original products) actually available on the market. None of these 
follow-on products have been approved as interchangeable with their 
reference products, which means that substitution of the 7 original 
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automatically. The price of these products was 10%–37% lower than 
the price of the original biologic, with the average price savings being 
24% or 27%. All 35 approved follow-on and reference products are 
owned by a total of 11 pharmaceutical companies. The number of 
years of market exclusivity of the 9 original biologics before the 
approval of the first biosimilar ranged between 13.5–28.92 with an 
average of 18.27 years or 15.33–29.42 with an average of 19.87 years 
before the launch of the first competing biosimilar.  
This Essay further puts forward a new method of measuring 
comparative levels of competition in drug markets by comparing the 
ratio of total approved follow-on products per total approved original 
products at certain critical benchmarks. Using this measurement tool, 
this Essay compares BPCIA’s track record with the levels of 
competition in small-molecule drugs before and after the Hatch–
Waxman Act, showing that that BPCIA significantly underperforms in 
comparison and fails to instigate levels of competition that would lead 
to significant price drops and increase access to biologics in the 
United States. A short survey of the most likely reasons for BPCIA’s 
underperformance follows.  
This Essay concludes by presenting the following question: if 
BPCIA’s current track record is (still) not enough to convince that it 
is failing to meet its goals, what more would it take to reach such a 
conclusion, and how much longer should policymakers wait before it 
is possible to surmise that BPCIA in its current form has failed to 
significantly increase access to biologics in the United States? 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed the Biologics 
Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA) as part of the Patient 
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Protection and Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”).1 The purpose of 
BPCIA was to create for biologics a regime similar to that of the Drug 
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (Hatch–Waxman 
Act)2 and, in doing so, to open biologics markets to greater 
competition and, subsequently, lower the price of these expensive and 
increasingly important pharmaceuticals.3 Ten years later, competition 
in biologics remains scant and prices high. Biologics product markets 
are highly concentrated in the hands of a few large pharmaceutical 
companies that compete over market share with small to minimal 
effect on product prices. While some believe that it might still be “too 
soon to give up” on BPCIA,4 others—including the undersigned—
have seen this as a sign of BPCIA’s failure.5  
Written for the Texas A&M University School of Law 
Symposium on Pharmaceutical Innovation, Patent Protection, and 
Regulatory Exclusivities, this Essay takes stock of the decade that has 
passed since the enactment of BPCIA. Relying on new data, this Essay 
surveys the state of competition in United States biologics markets, 
entry of follow-on biologics (“biosimilars”) into these markets, and 
the effects such entry has had on biologics prices. This Essay further 
puts forward a new method of measuring comparative levels of 
competition in drug markets by comparing the ratio of total approved 
follow-on products per approved original products. Using this 
measurement tool, this Essay compares BPCIA’s track record with the 
 
 1. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. NO. 111-148, §§ 
7001–7003, 124 Stat. 119, 804–23 (2010). 
 2. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, PUB. L. 
NO. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 35 
& 42 U.S.C. (2012)) [hereinafter Hatch-Waxman Act]. 
 3. See e.g., Andrew W. Mulcahy et al., Biosimilar Cost Savings in the United 
States, 7 RAND HEALTH Q. 3, 6 (2018) (“[W]hile only 1-2 percent of the U.S. 
population is treated with a specialty drug each year—a category that includes 
biologics and other complex, often expensive drugs, biologics alone accounted for 
38 percent of U.S. prescription drug spending in 2015 due to their high cost per dose, 
and for 70 percent of drug spending growth between 2010 and 2015.” 
 4. See, e.g., Jonathan J. Darrow, Biosimilar Approvals and the BPCIA: Too 
Soon to Give Up, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (July 19, 2019), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190718.722161/full/ 
[https://perma.cc/6ADQ-27RQ]. 
 5. See e.g., Preston Atteberry et al., Biologics Are Natural Monopolies (Part 
1): Why Biosimilars Do Not Create Effective Competition, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG 
(Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190405.396631 
/full/ [https://perma.cc/F4US-YPFF]; Yaniv Heled, Follow-On Biologics are Set Up 
to Fail, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 113, 115 (2018). 
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state of competition in small-molecule drugs before and after the 
Hatch–Waxman Act, concluding that BPCIA significantly 
underperforms in comparison and fails to instigate the kind of 
competition that would lead to significant drops in the prices of 
biologics in the United States. A short survey of the most likely 
reasons for BPCIA’s underperformance follows.  
This Essay concludes by presenting this question: if BPCIA’s 
current track record is (still) not enough to convince that it is failing to 
meet its goals of significantly increasing access to biologics in the 
United States, what more would it take to reach such a conclusion, and 
how much longer should policymakers wait? 
II. BPCIA AT 10—THE NUMBERS 
After significant delays in BPCIA’s implementation,6 in 
March 2015, the FDA approved the first follow-on version of a 
biologic: the biosimilar Zarxio.7 Between that time and March 23, 
2020—exactly ten years since BPCIA was signed—the FDA approved 
a total of 26 follow-on biologics that were deemed biosimilar to 9 
original products (“reference products”8).9 None of these 26 
biosimilars have been approved as or deemed interchangeable with 
 
 6. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 7. Drugs@FDA: FDA-Approved Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/daf/index.cfm?event=overview.proces
s&ApplNo=125553 [https://perma.cc/N2V6-D7VH] (last visited May 13, 2020) 
(citing the approval date of Zarxio as March 6, 2015). 
 8. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(4) (2018) (“The term ‘reference product’ means the 
single biological product licensed under subsection (a) against which a [follow-on] 
biological product is evaluated…”). 
 9. See infra Appendix A, Table I [hereinafter Table I]. According to the FDA’s 
Purple Book, by that date the FDA had approved about 270 original biologics for 
marketing in the United States (including 17 products whose licenses were later 
voluntarily revoked). See FDA, Purple Book: Database of Licensed Biological 
Products, https://purplebooksearch.fda.gov/advanced-search 
[https://perma.cc/3SWT-QPR6] (last visited May 31, 2020). The number of 
approved biologics is exclusive of vaccines, blood products, gene therapies, 
allergens, and other products approved by the Center for Biologics Evaluation and 
Research. See Purple Book: Database of Licensed Biological Products, U.S. FOOD 
& DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/media/89426/download (last accessed June 
27, 2020) [https://perma.cc/YB78-P7EK]. The numbers include products that were 
originally approved as small-molecule drugs but were “deemed” to have been 
approved as biologics as of March 23, 2020. See infra notes 55–56 and 
accompanying text; See also List of Approved NDAs for Biological Products that 
were Deemed to be BLAs on March 23, 2020, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (2020), 
https://www.fda.gov/media/119229/download [https://perma.cc/C8B2-3JK5]. 
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their reference product,10 which means that substitution of the 9 
original products with one of their approved biosimilars cannot be 
done automatically, but rather require the prescribing physician to 
specifically prescribe the biosimilar.11 As of May 2020, only 16 of 
these 26 approved biosimilars, which were deemed biosimilar to 7 
reference products, were actually available on the market.12 The price 
of these products was 10%–37% lower, on average, than the price of 
the original biologic,13 with the average price savings being 24% or 
27%.14   
Eight pharmaceutical companies owned the 26 approved 
biosimilars.15 Four companies owned the 9 original products with 
which these biosimilars sought to compete.16 In total, competition in 
biologics occurred between 11 pharmaceutical companies (with 
Amgen owning both original and follow-on products). The ratio of 
original product owners to follow-on product owners is 1:2, 
suggesting that concentration levels in biologics product markets 
remain high even after original products lose their exclusivity 
protections.  
The 9 original biologics for which biosimilars have been 
approved had between 1–5 approved biosimilars with an average of 
2.63 approved biosimilars for each original product and 1.78 launched 
biosimilars per original product.17 
 
 10. Non-interchangeable pharmaceuticals are, by their nature, not fungible and 
therefore produce little competition. See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.  
 11. See Heled supra note 5, at 125–26. 
 12. See infra Table I. 
 13. Data is based on prices listed on the websites Drugs.com and GoodRx.com 
on May 7, 2020. See Appendix A, Table II. According to GoodRx.com (but not 
Drugs.com), as of April 2020, the price of Pfizer’s Retacrit—the only approved 
biosimilar for Amgen’s original biologics Epogen and Procrit, constituted savings 
of 67% and 80% respectively. See Lauren Chase, A Guide to Biosimilar Prices: How 
Much They Cost and How You Can Save, GOODRX BLOG (Apr. 14, 2020, 11:32 AM) 
https://www.goodrx.com/blog/biosimilars-prices-how-much-they-cost-how-to-
save/ [https://perma.cc/E5F8-3WAR]. 
 14. Based on average savings calculations from Drugs.com and GoodRx.com 
respectively. See infra Appendix A, Table III [hereinafter Table III]. 
 15. The companies are Amgen, Boehringer Ingelheim, Celltrion (a subsidiary of 
Teva), Coherus BioSciences, Mylan GmbH, Pfizer (including its subsidiary 
Hospira), Samsung Bioepis, and Sandoz. See infra Table I. 
 16. The companies are AbbVie, Amgen, Genentech (a subsidiary of Roche), and 
Janssen Biotech (a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson). See Table I. 
 17. See infra Table III. 
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The number of years of market exclusivity of the 9 original 
biologics before the approval of the first biosimilar ranged between 
13.5–28.92 with an average of 18.27 years.18 The number of years of 
market exclusivity of these 9 original biologics before the launch of 
the first competing biosimilar (which virtually always came many 
months after FDA approval) ranged between 15.33–29.42, and the 
average years of market exclusivity was 19.87.19 The average list price 
of original biologics for which there already were biosimilars 
available on the market was $3,750 per month.20   
As these numbers show, ten years after BPCIA’s enactment, it 
has brought only minimal competition to a mere handful of biologics 
markets and led to small price drops in these markets.21 Despite 
 
 18. Id. According to research funded by the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA)—the pharmaceutical industry’s main lobbying 
arm—the average period of market exclusivity in small-molecule drugs for which 
follow-on products were approved between 1995–2014 was 12.5 years for products 
with annual sales greater than $250 million and 13.6 years overall. See Henry 
Grabowski et al., Updated Trends in US Brand-Name and Generic Drug 
Competition, 19 J. MED. ECON. 836, 836 (2016). This means that exclusivity in 
biologics for which follow-on products were approved between 2015–2020 was 
between 1–16.42 and on average 5.77 years longer than the average exclusivity in 
high-grossing, small-molecule drugs.  
 19. See infra Table III. This means that exclusivity in biologics for which follow-
on products were launched was between 2.83–16.92 and on average 6.37 years 
longer than the average exclusivity in high-grossing, small-molecule drugs.   
 20. See infra Table III. While the list price, namely the price a manufacturer 
assigns to a drug product, does not reflect discounts that are typically given to health 
insurance providers, it is still the price that patients without insurance may pay and 
is the official price tag of a pharmaceutical. See also Chase, supra note 13; cf. Joel 
Lexchin, Affordable Biologics for All, JAMA NETWORK OPEN e204753 (Apr. 27, 
2020), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2764808 
[https://perma.cc/Q8UF-JJ4R]. 
 21. As in previous work, by significant/meaningful/true competition I mean 
levels of competition sufficient to drive down the cost of biologics (and follow-on 
versions thereof) significantly for payors and patient-consumers, well beyond the 
10%–37% price drops currently observed in the United States’ biologics markets 
subsequent to follow-on products’ entry. For comparison, in the context of small-
molecule drugs, significant price drops of more than 70% are typical subsequent to 
the entry of 4–5 or more generic products into a specific drug market. See New 
Evidence Linking Greater Generic Competition and Lower Generic Drug Prices, 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/center-drug-
evaluation-and-research-cder/generic-competition-and-drug-prices 
[https://perma.cc/RVM9-2375] (last visited May 13, 2020). See also Generic 
Competition and Drug Prices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://wayback.archive-
it.org/7993/20190423134204/https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/Offi
ceofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ucm129385.htm [https://perma.cc/3UZJ-
R39Y] (last visited May 13, 2020). 
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BPCIA’s creation of a regulatory pathway for approval of follow-on 
biologics, product markets remain highly concentrated in the hands of 
a few large pharmaceutical companies that compete with each other 
over market share with small to minimal effect on product prices.  
Interestingly, BPCIA’s highly controversial and unusually 
long22 twelve-year market exclusivity for original biologics with 
approved follow-on products23 has proved to be shorter, in some cases 
much shorter, than the actual period during which these original 
products maintain their exclusivity in their respective product-
markets. Indeed, even the shortest period—15.33 years in Genentech’s 
Avastin—was 3 years and 4 months longer than the twelve-year 
exclusivity awarded under BPCIA;24 the longest period—29.42 years 
in Amgen’s Epogen/Procrit—was nearly 17 years and 6 months 
longer, 2.5 times BPCIA’s twelve-year exclusivity.25 These numbers 
support the proposition that biologics are “natural monopolies” that 
are not amenable to meaningful competition (or that they are grossly 
overprotected) and that attempts—such as BPCIA26—to significantly 
lower biologics’ prices through market mechanisms is therefore 
unlikely to succeed.27  
III. NOT A HATCH–WAXMAN SUCCESS STORY 
From its inception, BPCIA was fashioned after the same 
concept that lies at the heart of the Hatch–Waxman Act: that original 
product prices would drop if follow-on products enter the market and 
that follow-on products would enter the market if follow-on product 
 
 22. See e.g., Heled, supra note 5, at 117 n.28.   
 23. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7) (2018). 
 24. See infra Table III. Notably, twelve years was the length of exclusivity for 
which the original products industry lobbied prior to the enactment of BPCIA. See, 
e.g., Safe and Affordable Biotech Drugs: The Need for a Generic Pathway: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. p. 162 
(2007) (statement of Henry Grabowski, Ph.D.) (recommending an exclusivity period 
of at least 10 years). See also Henry Grabowski, Follow-on Biologics: Data 
Exclusivity and the Balance Between Innovation and Competition, 7 NATURE REV. 
DRUG DISCOVERIES 479, 486 (2008) (in research funded by PhRMA, arguing that 
the proper market exclusivity period for biologics should fall between 12.9 and 16.2 
years).   
 25. See infra Table III.  
 26. An even less complementary view of BPCIA is that from its outset it was ill-
equipped to instill significant competition into biologics markets. See, e.g., Heled, 
supra note 5, at 115–19.   
 27. See, e.g., Atteberry et al., supra note 5. 
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manufacturers are allowed to “piggyback” on earlier approvals of 
original products and make their own copycat versions. In this way, 
presumably, follow-on product manufacturers would be able to save 
the time and money involved in developing an original product and 
partake in existing, lucrative product markets. This arrangement was 
implemented in small-molecule drugs starting the 1970s and was, 
ultimately, streamlined and improved in the Hatch–Waxman Act in 
1984.28 The Hatch–Waxman Act’s success has made it the model that 
BPCIA was meant to follow.  
Nonetheless, a straight up comparison of BPCIA’s track record 
with that of the Hatch–Waxman Act is problematic. As Professor 
Jonathan Darrow explained, there are several, significant differences 
between small-molecule drug markets subsequent to the enactment of 
the Hatch–Waxman Act in 1984 and biologics markets subsequent to 
the enactment of BPCIA in 2010. By the enactment of the Hatch–
Waxman Act, the FDA had already approved follow-on 
pharmaceutical product applications for about fourteen years, and both 
regulators and product developers had acquired significant experience 
from approval of more than 2,000 such applications.29 By contrast, 
when BPCIA was signed into law, the FDA and product developers 
had little to no experience in making and comparing follow-on 
biologics.30 Professor Darrow also correctly notes that a numeric 
 
 28. See Jonathan Darrow, The Rise of Biosimilars: Success of the BPCIA? (Part 
I), BILL OF HEALTH BLOG (Jan. 31, 2020), 
https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/01/31/the-rise-of-biosimilars-success-
of-the-bpcia/ [https://perma.cc/E8RS-FR56] (reviewing the history of approval of 
follow-on pharmaceutical product applications by the FDA beginning the 1970s). In 
addition to setting the pathway for approval of follow-on small-molecule drugs in 
legislation, the Hatch–Waxman Act instituted incentives for development of original 
and generic drugs and established an intricate patent dispute resolution framework 
(including the Orange Book) that is interwoven into the pathway for approval of 
generic versions of original products. See Hatch–Waxman Act, supra note 2.  
 29. See Drugs@FDA Data Files, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Drugs@FDA 
Data Files, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-approvals-and-databases/drugsfda-
data-files [https://perma.cc/LC2E-DSFR] (last visited May 31, 2020). The data 
includes original and supplemental approved applications. The results exclude 
tentatively approved applications and supplemental applications for which there was 
an approved original application.  
 30. See Jonathan Darrow, The Rise of Biosimilars: Success of the BPCIA? (Part 
I), BILL OF HEALTH BLOG (Jan. 31, 2020), 
https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/01/31/the-rise-of-biosimilars-success-
of-the-bpcia/ [https://perma.cc/E8RS-FR56]. What little experience product 
developers have had with development and approval of follow-on biologics was 
based on their experience in Europe. See discussion infra Part IV.  
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comparison of the number of original products amenable to follow-on 
product applications—subsequent to the enactment of the Hatch–
Waxman Act and BPCIA—is not instructive because there were and 
still are far more original small-molecule products than biologics that 
are amenable to such applications.31 In other words, there were 
significantly fewer original biologics amenable to follow-on 
competition in 2010 than there were small-molecule drugs amenable 
to competition before and subsequent to the enactment of the Hatch–
Waxman Act in 1984.  
Still, some insight into the performance of BPCIA may be 
gleaned from comparing the ratios of approved follow-on products to 
original products under both regimes around the time that the FDA 
and the industry are likely to have acquired experience with follow-on 
applications. Measurement of approved follow-on to original product 
ratios—which is proposed here for the first time as a means of 
measuring comparative levels of competition in drug markets—
provides a bird’s-eye view of the level of follow-on competition in 
pharmaceutical markets in their entirety (as opposed to specific drug 
markets). As such, the measurement of ratios provides a picture of the 
extent of “openness” of drug markets to competition and the 
willingness and ability of follow-on manufacturers to develop and 
pursue approval of follow-on versions of original pharmaceutical 
products, and the ability of follow-on manufacturers to do so 
successfully, despite whatever technical and regulatory hurdles they 
may face. Because the comparison is one of ratios rather than product 
numbers, the comparison makes it possible to control for differences 
in sheer number of approved products. Accordingly, a comparison of 
the number of follow-on applications per number of original products 
a decade after the commencement of FDA approval of follow-on 
 
 31. See Jonathan Darrow, The Rise of Biosimilars: Success of the BPCIA? (Part 
II), BILL OF HEALTH BLOG (Feb. 3, 2020), 
https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/02/03/the-rise-of-biosimilars-success-
of-the-bpcia-part-ii/ [https://perma.cc/5TFS-YGD4]. There is no good data on how 
many original biologics were no longer protected by exclusivity and therefore 
amenable to follow-on competition in 2010. However, it is highly probable that the 
number of such products was also significantly smaller than the number of products 
amenable to such competition when the Hatch–Waxman Act was enacted, which 
was estimated at 125. See id. 
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applications in biologics and small-molecule drug markets, 
respectively, may be instructive.32  
By April 24, 1980—a decade after the FDA announced that it 
will accept and start approving follow-on products (Abbreviated New 
Drug Applications or “ANDA”s)33—the FDA approved 1,193 
applications for original drugs (New Drug Applications or “NDA”s) 
and 1,324 ANDAs—a ratio of 1.1 approved follow-on products per 1 
original product.34 By September 24, 1984—the day the Hatch–
Waxman Act was signed into law—the FDA approved 1,580 NDAs 
and 2,131 ANDAs, giving a ratio of 1.35 approved follow-on products 
per 1 original product.35 And by September 24, 1994, ten years after 
the enactment of the Hatch–Waxman Act, the FDA approved 2,289 
NDAs and 4,375 ANDAs, resulting in a ratio of 1.91 approved follow 
on products per 1 original product.36 The trend of ratios of the total 
numbers of approved ANDAs to NDAs over time may be observed in 
the following chart:  
 
 
 32. Notably, while the comparison of ratios of follow-on and approved products 
is useful for overcoming the variance in the number of total approved products under 
the different regulatory regimes, it may be insufficiently sensitive—at least in its 
current form—to potentially important differences in the commercial and regulatory 
realities of small-molecule drugs and biologics, including in the length of exclusivity 
protections and market sizes. Controlling for these factors, however, is beyond the 
scope of this work. At the very least, as it currently stands, the comparison supports 
the proposition that ten years after the enactment of BPCIA levels of competition in 
biologics markets are not even close to the levels of competition seen in small-
molecule drug markets even before the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act, let 
alone ten years after its enactment.   
 33. See Food and Drug Administration, Abbreviated Applications, 35 Fed. Reg. 
6574, 13540 (Apr. 24, 1970). 
 34. See Drugs@FDA Data Files, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Drugs@FDA 
Data Files, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-approvals-and-databases/drugsfda-
data-files [https://perma.cc/LC2E-DSFR] (last visited May 31, 2020) (data includes 
original and supplemental approved applications). The results exclude tentatively 
approved applications and supplemental applications for which there was an 
approved original application. 
 35. Id.   
 36. Id.   
  




By comparison, by March 23, 2020, a decade after the 
enactment of BPCIA, the FDA approved a total of 268 original 
biologics and 26 applications for follow-on products,37 a ratio of about 
0.1 follow-on products per 1 original product, or 1 follow-on product 
per 10 original products. The trend of ratios of the total number of 
approved biosimilars (“ABLA”s) to original biologics (“BLA”s) over 




A comparison of the ratios and trends of approvals of follow-on 
products per original products over time is illustrated in the chart 
 
 37. See Purple Book: Database of Licensed Biological Products, U.S. FOOD & 
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below with “year 0” designated as the year of enactment of legislation 
formalizing the process of approval of follow-on products—Hatch–





Examination of these trends reveals, again, a significant 
underperformance of BPCIA compared to the approval of generic 
drugs both before and after the enactment of the Hatch–Waxman Act. 
The comparative underperformance of BPCIA can be attributed, at 
least in part, to the fact that biologics are typically covered by more 
patents than a typical small-molecule drug product, are more difficult 
to imitate, and that the commercial and regulatory realities of 
small-molecule drugs and biologics are different. Still, if drafters of 
the BPCIA expected it to function like the Hatch–Waxman Act, then 
these numbers show that it is failing to do so. In comparing the 
performance of BPCIA to the track record of approval of follow-on 
small-molecule drugs, it is also important to remember that products 
approved under an ANDA are generic versions of the original product 
and, thus, automatically substitutable with the original product. 
Biosimilars, on the other hand—at least the ones that have been 
approved to date—are not automatically substitutable with the 
original, reference product and are, thus, inferior as potential 
instigators of competition and price drops in their respective drug 
markets, which further contributes to the conclusion that BPCIA fails 
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Furthermore, experience from the area of small-molecule 
drugs shows that significant price drops of over 70% typically require 
4 or more different competitors in the same product market.38 By April 
24, 1980, there were 96 original small-molecule drug products with 4 
or more approved follow-on versions; by September 24, 1984, there 
were 142; by September 24, 1994, there were 292.39 In comparison, 
by March 2020, there was only 1 original biologic—Genentech’s 
Herceptin—with 4 follow-on versions available on the market.40 None 
of these 4 follow-on products are interchangeable with the original 
product, and the price savings in these products range between 10%–
27% as compared with the original product.41  
To recap, these numbers show that ten years after the 
enactment of BPCIA the levels of competition (and price drops) in 
biologics markets are nowhere near the levels seen a decade after the 
FDA began approving follow-on versions of original small-molecule 
drug products before the enactment of the Hatch–Waxman Act. They 
are light-years away from the levels of competition seen ten years after 
the enactment of the Hatch–Waxman Act.  
IV. REASONS FOR BPCIA’S POOR TRACK RECORD 
There are many causes for BPCIA’s poor track record and, 
more generally, the ongoing lack of significant price competition in 
biologics markets.42 To begin with, at least some of BPCIA’s 
 
 38. See New Evidence Linking Greater Generic Competition and Lower Generic 
Drug Prices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/center-
drug-evaluation-and-research-cder/generic-competition-and-drug-prices 
[https://perma.cc/RVM9-2375] (last visited May 13, 2020); see also Generic 
Competition and Drug Prices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://wayback.archive-
it.org/7993/20190423134204/https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/Offi
ceofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ucm129385.htm [https://perma.cc/3UZJ-
R39Y] (last visited May 13, 2020). 
 39. See Drugs@FDA Data Files, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Drugs@FDA 
Data Files, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-approvals-and-databases/drugsfda-
data-files [https://perma.cc/LC2E-DSFR] (last visited May 31, 2020) (data includes 
original and supplemental approved applications). The results exclude tentatively 
approved applications and supplemental applications for which there was an 
approved original application. 
 40. See infra Table I. 
 41. See infra Table III. 
 42. See e.g., Preston Atteberry et al., Biologics Are Natural Monopolies (Part 
1): Why Biosimilars Do Not Create Effective Competition, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG 
(Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190405.396631 
/full/ [https://perma.cc/F4US-YPFF]; Michael A. Carrier & Carl J. Minniti III, 
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disappointing track record may be attributed to its relative 
“belatedness” and to delays in its implementation. By the time of 
BPCIA’s enactment in 2010, the United States was already well 
behind Europe in instituting a framework for approval of follow-on 
biologics, especially considering that discussions of follow-on 
biologics and creation of a Hatch–Waxman-like framework for 
biologics have been ongoing in the United States since the late 
1990s.43 To compare, Europe has had a framework for approval of 
follow-on biologics in place since 2003, approved its first biosimilar 
application in 2006, and has approved 66 follow-on biologics since.44 
And yet, it took the FDA two years after BPCIA was enacted to issue 
its first draft guidance on how the FDA intends to evaluate 
 
Biologics: The New Antitrust Frontier, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 67–68 (2018); Heled, 
supra note 5, at 135. 
 43. See Krista Hessler Carver, Jeffrey Elikan, & Erika Lietzan, An Unofficial 
Legislative History of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 
65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 671, 685–86 (2010). 




ed_biosimilar [https://perma.cc/7YB3-TWM4] (noting two more applications were 
refused and, of the 66 approved products, 9 were withdrawn). 
  Notably, the first biosimilar approved in by the EMA was also approved in 
the United States that same year, albeit not as a biosimilar but rather as a drug. See 
Jonathan Darrow, The Rise of Biosimilars: Success of the BPCIA? (Part II), BILL OF 
HEALTH BLOG (Feb. 3, 2020), https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/02/03/ 
the-rise-of-biosimilars-success-of-the-bpcia-part-ii/ [https://perma.cc/5TFS-YGD4] 
(discussing the approval of somatropin (Omnitrope) in both Europe and the United 
States in 2006.  
  The comparison to Europe is only helpful with respect to the track record of 
follow-on product approvals to show the FDA’s relative delay as compared with the 
EMA. The comparison to Europe becomes less helpful, however, perhaps even 
meaningless, when it comes to levels of competition in biologics markets and 
resultant price drops. This is because of two main reasons. First, virtually all 
European Union (EU) member states have implemented measures to control the 
price of biologics and do not rely on competition as the sole means of increasing 
access to biologics. Second, unlike the United States, Europe does not have a central 
framework for approval of biologics as interchangeable with each other and the 
substitution of original biologics with their follow-on versions is subject to specific 
arrangements within each of the EU member states. See, e.g., David J. Gross et al., 
International Pharmaceutical Spending Controls: France, Germany, Sweden, and 
the United Kingdom, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. (1994),  
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4193451/ [https://perma.cc/DZN 
9-8J2J]; Pugatch Consilium, Towards a Sustainable European Market for Off-
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applications for follow-on biologics and another three years to issue 
the final guidance.45 By that point, in April 2015, Europe had already 
been approving follow-on biologics for marketing for nine years and 
had granted approval to 21 follow-on biologic applications (with one 
more application refused).46 The FDA’s relative delay is even more 
disappointing in light of the establishment in June 2011 of a 
collaboration between the FDA and the European Medicines Agency 
whose purpose has been “the alignment on scientific approaches to the 
evaluation of biosimilar medicines in order to increase convergence, 
so that data developed for one regulatory authority could be accepted 
to another regulatory authority.”47  
But the most crucial delay has been in the implementation of 
BPCIA’s most important part: the creation of a pathway for approval 
of interchangeable biosimilars.48 As the Hatch–Waxman experience 
has shown, a critical component of increasing access to 
pharmaceuticals is the automatic substitution of original products with 
 
 45. See, respectively, FDA, Guidance for Industry, Scientific Considerations in 
Demonstrating Biosimilarity to a Reference Product (Feb. 2012), 
file:///C:/Users/yaniv/AppData/Local/Temp/FDA-2011-D-0605-0002.pdf; FDA, 
Scientific Considerations in Demonstrating Biosimilarity to a Reference Product, 
Guidance for Industry (Apr. 2015), 
file:///C:/Users/yaniv/AppData/Local/Temp/Scientific_Considerations_in_Demons
trating_Biosimilarity_to_a_Reference_Product_Guidance_for_Industr.pdf. 





(showing the relative tardiness of the United States compared to Europe). Europe, 
however, is not a good basis for comparison of price competition in biologics 
because virtually all European countries employ one form or another of government 
control over the price of pharmaceuticals, including biologics.   
 47. See EMA and FDA to Collaborate on Biosimilars, GENERICS AND 
BIOSIMILARS INITIATIVE (July 1, 2011), 
http://www.gabionline.net/Biosimilars/News/EMA-and-FDA-to-collaborate-on-
biosimilars [https://perma.cc/E66E-AXFD]; Cluster Activities, EUROPEAN 
MEDICINES AGENCY, https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/partners-
networks/international-activities/cluster-activities#biosimilars-section 
[https://perma.cc/6FU2-VJRX] (last accessed July 1, 2020).  
 48. Considerations in Demonstrating Interchangeability with a Reference 
Product Guidance for Industry, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, 1 (May 2019), 
https://www.fda.gov/media/124907/download [https://perma.cc/VEB7-5SU4]; 
Once approved as interchangeable, a biosimilar product, by definition, “may be 
substituted for the reference product without the intervention of the health care 
provider who prescribed the reference product.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 262(i)(3), (k)(2)(B), 
(k)(3)(A)(ii), and (k)(4). 
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their cheaper follow-on versions.49 Indeed, entry of mere alternative 
pharmaceutical products (which are not automatically substitutable, 
a.k.a. “me-too” drugs50) typically leads only to modest price drops, if 
any.51 Without automatic substitution, competition from non-
interchangeable biosimilars has not and is unlikely to result in 
significant price competition.52 Yet it took the FDA more than nine 
years after the enactment of BPCIA to issue its guidance on how the 
FDA intends to evaluate interchangeability of follow-on biologics.53  
 
 49. To be sure, automatic substitution is a necessary but not sufficient condition. 
To achieve significant price drops of over 70%, it is necessary that there be more 
than just 2–3 alternatives in any given product market. See New Evidence Linking 
Greater Generic Competition and Lower Generic Drug Prices supra note 21.  
 50. U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, PHARMACEUTICAL R&D: 
COSTS, RISKS AND REWARDS, OTA-H-522, at 46 (1993). (“[M]e-too drugs are 
introduced after the pioneer and are similar but not identical to pioneer compounds 
. . . Many me-too drugs are developed through deliberate imitation of the pioneer 
compound and have a shorter and more certain discovery period. . ..  The pursuit of 
“me-too” drugs is an attempt by rival firms to shave off part of the monopoly profits 
enjoyed by the maker of the pioneer drug in a therapeutic class”). 
 51. See Aidan Hollis, Me Too Drugs: Is There a Problem?, (2004), 
https://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/topics/ip/Me-tooDrugs_Hollis1.pdf?ua=1 
[https://perma.cc/ZY7M-4ASQ] (“Me-too  drugs  very  frequently  not  only  fail  to  
increase  price  competition  but  may  even  lead  to  price  increases”). 
 52. While there are a few notable exceptions, experience in both Europe and the 
United States thus far indicates that entry of non-interchangeable biosimilars only 
leads to price drops of about 5%–35%. See infra Table III Emerging Health Care 
Issues: Follow-On Biologic Drug Competition, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
(2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/emerging-health-
care-issues-follow-biologic-drug-competition-federal-trade-commission-
report/p083901biologicsreport.pdf (last visited June 3, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/675V-V7KP]; Francis Megerlin, et al., Biosimilars and the 
European Experience: Implications for the United States, 32 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1803, 
1803 (2013). But see, e.g., Eric Sagonowsky, AbbVie offers up 80% Humira 
Discount in EU Tender Market to Hold Off Biosimilars: Report, FIERCEPHARMA 
(Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/abbvie-offers-up-80-
humira-discount-eu-tender-market-to-hold-off-biosims-report [https://perma.cc/ 
8KFT-4E66]. However, without interchangeability such price drops are highly 
unlikely in the United States, which—unlike European countries (and virtually all 
other countries)—has no means for controlling the price of pharmaceuticals and 
relies exclusively on competition to lower the cost of biologics in hopes that market 
mechanisms would, eventually, result in increased access. Examples of significant 
price drops in certain biologics market products in specific European countries are 
therefore not instructive for the United States. 
 53. Considerations in Demonstrating Interchangeability with a Reference 
Product Guidance for Industry, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., (May 2019), 
https://www.fda.gov/media/124907/download [https://perma.cc/R2WG-HNUP]. 
To be fair, in coming up with its interchangeability guidance, since no other 
country—including Europe—has created a way of establishing interchangeability, 
the FDA had to create a completely new framework without being able to learn 
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Notably, recognizing the glacial pace of entry of competition 
into biologics markets, in July 2018, the FDA announced a Biosimilars 
Action Plan, whose stated goal is to increase patient access to 
biologics and which includes measures and initiatives to that effect.54 
As mandated under BPCIA,55 the FDA has also taken steps to increase 
competition in older biologics (e.g., insulin and human growth 
hormone, which have been previously approved as drugs) by 
“deeming” them subject to follow-on competition under BPCIA as of 
March 2020.56 The effects of these measures on competition in 
biologics markets are yet to be seen.57  
A second likely reason for BPCIA’s poor track record is that, 
to begin with, making follow-on versions of biologics is a much more 
complex, expensive, and risky (but apparently not more 
time-consuming58) business than making follow-on versions of small-
 
(much) from experience in other jurisdictions. 
 54. Biosimilars Action Plan: Balancing Innovation and Competition, U.S. FOOD 
& DRUG ADMIN., (Jul. 2018), https://www.fda.gov/media/114574/download 
[https://perma.cc/2JZH-9U3W].  
 55. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 42 U.S.C. § 262 
note (2006, Supp. IV 2010) (Conforming Amendments Under The Federal Food, 
Drug, And Cosmetic Act) (“An approved application for a biological product under 
section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act . . . shall be deemed to be 
a license for the biological product under [BPCIA] on the date that is 10 years after 
the date of enactment of this Act.”).   
 56. See “Deemed to be a License” Provision of the BPCI Act, U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/guidance-compliance-regulatory-
information/deemed-be-license-provision-bpci-act (last accessed May 16, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/6GJZ-7LB4]; List of Approved NDAs for Biological Products that 
were Deemed to be BLAs on March 23, 2020, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (2020), 
https://www.fda.gov/media/119229/download [https://perma.cc/C8B2-3JK5]. 
 57. Several commentators, including former FDA Commissioner, Scott Gottlieb, 
and the undersigned, have expressed skepticism regarding the FDA’s ability to lower 
biologics prices. See, e.g., Simone A. Rose and Tracea Rice, The Biosimilar Action 
Plan: An Effective Mechanism for Balancing Biologic Innovation and Competition 
in the United States?, MCGEORGE LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 2020) (expressing 
skepticism about the FDA’s Biosimilar Action Plan ability to curb anticompetitive 
behaviors that negatively impact access to biologics); Sue Sutter, Interchangeability 
Won’t Solve US Biosimilar Market’s Woes, FDA’s Gottlieb Says, PINK SHEET, Jul. 
18, 2018, 
https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS123525/Interchangeability-Wont-
Solve-US-Biosimilar-Markets-Woes-FDAs-Gottlieb-Says; Sue Sutter, Biosimilar 
Switching Studies May Not Be Worth Effort For US Interchangeability, Sponsors 
Say, PINK SHEET, Nov. 7, 2019, 
https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS141151/Biosimilar-Switching-
Studies-May-Not-Be-Worth-Effort-For-US-Interchangeability-Sponsors-Say. 
 58. See Reed F. Beall et al., Pre-Market Development Times for Biologic Versus 
Small-Molecule Drugs, 37 NATURE BIOTECH 708, 709 (2019). 
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molecule drugs.59 As a result of this reality, only a handful companies 
have the technical capabilities and financial means necessary to 
develop and commercialize follow-on biologics, leading to highly 
concentrated (and cartel-prone) product markets.  
Other reasons for BPCIA’s poor track record can be traced 
back to the original biologics industry’s successful efforts to block, 
delay, and undermine competition in biologics markets by any means 
at their disposal. As described more fully elsewhere, these successes 
include convincing the FDA and Congress to accept and uphold the 
industry’s view that regulatory filings submitted to the FDA are 
proprietary and confidential;60 enacting laws in virtually all states and 
United States territories that make the substitution of original 
biologics with follow-on versions onerous and cumbersome;61 filing 
lawsuits—sometimes multiple—against virtually any attempt to 
approve and launch follow-on biologics;62 and amassing vast patent 
portfolios with the explicit goal of deterring potential competitors 
from attempting to develop and launch follow-on versions of original 
biologics.63  
 
 59. See, e.g., Jonathan Darrow, The Rise of Biosimilars: Success of the BPCIA? 
(Part I), BILL OF HEALTH BLOG (Jan. 31, 2020), 
https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/01/31/the-rise-of-biosimilars-success-
of-the-bpcia/ [https://perma.cc/E8RS-FR56] (citing also differences in patient 
population sizes and drug manufacturing, storage, and transportation costs). 
 60. See Heled, supra note 5, at 119; Yaniv Heled, The Case for Disclosure of 
Biologics Manufacturing Information, 47 J. L. MED. ETHICS 54, 56 (2019). 
 61. See Heled, supra note 5, at 125–128 (2018). 
 62. Id. at 128–133; see also Joshua Whitehill, BPCIA Litigations, BIG 
MOLECULE WATCH BLOG (last visited June 1, 2020), 
https://www.bigmoleculewatch.com/bpcia-patent-litigations/ 
[https://perma.cc/HSW8-GVJP] (listing 28 different litigation cases.) 
 63. See, e.g., Stanton R. Mehr, Can the FTC Clear a Path to Biosimilar Access 
Through the Patent Thicket?, BIOSIMILAR DEVELOPMENT (Jun. 4, 2019), 
https://www.biosimilardevelopment.com/doc/can-the-ftc-clear-a-path-for-
biosimilar-access-through-the-patent-thicket-0001 [https://perma.cc/E2M8-
XDZT]; Andrew Pollack, Makers of Humira and Enbrel Using New Drug Patents 
to Delay Generic Versions, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 15, 2016) (quoting an AbbVie 
executive saying “[a]ny company seeking to market a biosimilar version of Humira 
will have to contend with this extensive patent estate, which AbbVie intends to 
enforce vigorously”); Cynthia Koons, This Shield of Patents Protects the World’s 
Best-Selling Drug, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 7, 2017, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-07/this-shield-of-patents-
protects-the-world-s-best-selling-drug [https://perma.cc/3PJ9-QWSW]; Biosimilars 
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Another possible contributor to BPCIA’s failure to result in 
significant price drops is the lack of adoption of biosimilars by 
patients, prescribers, and payors,64 which may also be partially 
attributable to original biologics developers’ efforts to undermine 
competition in biologics markets.65 This lack of adoption, in and of 
itself, might be a result of some of the underlying realities of biologics 
markets (e.g., insufficient cost savings to encourage switching to the 
biosimilar, regulatory hassle involved in switching, lack of clear 
clinical finding(s) of substitutability, etc.), and such lack of adoption 
is sure to make the development and marketing of follow-on biologics 
an even less attractive prospect.   
Last but not least, BPCIA’s failure to instill significant levels 
of competition into biologics markets is due to the act itself. Although 
BPCIA drafters and proponents have sought to portray it as a 
compromise between the interests of original and follow-on biologics 
developers, the reality is that BPCIA has always been highly favorable 
to the original biologics developers who forcefully promoted it.66 Most 
critically, unlike the Hatch–Waxman Act, BPCIA does not make the 
development and approval of follow-on biologics sufficiently cheap 
for follow-on product developers, making it difficult for biosimilar 
 
KQ2U]. 
 64. See, e.g., Richard G. Frank, Friction in the Path to Use of Biosimilar Drugs, 
378 NEW ENG. J. MED. 791, 791 (2018); Ed Silverman, Biosimilars Got the Cold 
Shoulder from Health Plans when it Came to Preferred Coverage, STAT+ (May 20, 
2020), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2020/05/20/biosimilars-biologics-
health-coverage-drug-prices/ [https://perma.cc/M3R2-2XNB]; Biosimilars Council, 




 65. See, e.g., Citizen Pet., PFIZER, INC. (Aug. 22, 2018), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2018-P-3281-0001 
[https://perma.cc/76RQ-ES4M] (decrying “certain patient-directed materials and 
social media disseminated by reference product sponsors omit[ing] or misstat[ing] 
key aspects of the definition of a biosimilar” and mischaracterizing the concepts of 
interchangeability and switching, and more); see also Promotional Labeling and 
Advertising Considerations for Prescription Biological Reference and Biosimilar 
Products Questions and Answers, Draft Guidance for Industry, U.S. FOOD AND 
DRUG ADMIN. (2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/134862/download 
[https://perma.cc/62RS-2X4E]. 
 66. See Heled, supra note 5, at 115–19. One possible way of achieving this goal 
would be to make original biologics manufacturing information available to follow-
on product developers, which would save them the significant resources necessary 
to recreate their own version of the original biologic such that it is sufficiently similar 
to be deemed “biosimilar” and/or interchangeable. Id. 
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developers to sell their products at significant discounts compared to 
the original product.67   
V. CONCLUSION 
Ten years after the enactment of BPCIA, the picture of 
competition in biologics entails a meager dozen actors wrestling over 
market share with their 16 me-too versions of 7 original reference 
products with little price competition and small to minimal savings for 
payors and patient-consumers. Competition in biologics at this time 
does not even begin to resemble the extent, savings, or kind of 
competition seen in drug markets even before the enactment of the 
Hatch–Waxman Act, let alone a decade after it was signed into law.  
The big winners in the current situation are pharma 
companies—both original and follow-on—that share in the bounty of 
increasing market demand for biologics and persistently high prices 
with minimal price erosion due to the launch of a few non-
interchangeable biosimilars per original product. At the same time, 
BPCIA has brought very little change to patient-consumers who 
continue to have few prescribing options for which they pay nearly the 
same price as they would for the original product. For payors, BPCIA 
provides very little salve to an ever-growing expenditure on biologics. 
For doctors and pharmacists, the lack of automatic substitution and 
increased administrative burden of using biosimilars mostly embodies 
a headache.  
If lowering the price of biologics is the goal and competition 
(rather than direct price regulation) is the means by which we seek to 
achieve that goal, then we ought to surmise that our primary 
instrument for lowering the price of biologics is deeply flawed and 
needs to be fixed. Setting aside the FDA’s partial responsibility for the 
delay in the implementation of BPCIA, there is very little that the FDA 
could do within the confines of its current powers to improve access 
to biologics. As I have argued elsewhere, it is highly doubtful that the 
measures the FDA is taking would be enough to lead to significant 
price competition in biologics markets.68 Remedying the current state 
of competition in biologics markets would require changing the 
paradigm of approval of follow-on biologics. This, however, can only 
 
 67. See Heled, supra note 60, at 56–58. 
 68. See Heled, supra note 60, at 55; see also Rose & Rice, supra note 57, at 1. 
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be done in primary legislation, making significant changes to BPCIA 
itself. But to do so, we must first recognize that BPCIA in its current 
form is not and, in all likelihood, will not bring significant price 
competition to United States biologics markets.  
While some still argue that BPCIA has not yet reached its full 
potential of increasing access to biologics,69 it is imperative that we 
ask: if BPCIA’s current track record is (still) not enough to convince 
us that it has failed to achieve its goal of significantly increasing access 
to biologics in the United States, what more would it take to reach such 
a conclusion, and how much longer should policymakers wait before 
we can surmise that? In answering this question, we ought to 
remember that the real goal behind the efforts to increase competition 
in biologics markets has never been to merely instigate some 
competition, mostly over market share, in a few highly lucrative 
product markets. Rather, it is to bring significant price drops that 




















 69. See Jonathan Darrow, The Rise of Biosimilars: Success of the BPCIA? (Part 































































Humira AbbVie 8/25/2017 No   
Abrilada  Pfizer 
adalimumab-
afzb 










Humira AbbVie 7/23/2019 No   
Mvasi  Amgen 
bevacizumab-
awwb 


















Enbrel  Amgen 4/25/2019 No   
Nivestym Hospira/Pfizer filgrastim-aafi Neupogen  Amgen 7/20/2018 Yes 10/1/2018 
Zarxio  Sandoz 
filgrastim-
sndz 










4/21/2017 Yes 7/24/2017 
  




















































Neulasta Amgen 11/2/2018 Yes 1/3/2019 
Fulphila  Mylan GmbH 
pegfilgrastim-
jmdb 








Rituxan Genentech 7/23/2019 Yes 1/23/2020 
Kanjinti  Amgen 
trastuzumab-
anns 
Herceptin Genentech 6/13/2019 Yes 7/18/2019 
Ogivri  Mylan GmbH 
trastuzumab-
dkst  














Herceptin Genentech 3/11/2019 Yes 2/19/2020 
  











72 Data collected on May 7, 2020. All sources are on file with author.  
Product 
Name 





Average Price of Reference 
Product on Drugs.com 




Hyrimoz     
Humira subcutaneous kit (10 
mg/0.1 ml) is around $5,810.97 for 
a supply of 2 
$8,542 for 1 carton 
(2 pens) of Humira 
40mg/0.4ml 
Cyltezo     
Humira subcutaneous kit (10 
mg/0.1 ml) is around $5,810.97 for 
a supply of 2 
$8,542 for 1 carton 
(2 pens) of Humira 
40mg/0.4m 
Abrilada      
Humira subcutaneous kit (10 
mg/0.1 ml) is around $5,810.97 for 
a supply of 2 
$8,542 for 1 carton 
(2 pens) of Humira 
40mg/0.4ml 
Amjevita     
Humira subcutaneous kit (10 
mg/0.1 ml) is around $5,810.97 for 
a supply of 2 
$8,542 for 1 carton 
(2 pens) of Humira 
40mg/0.4ml 
Hadlima     
Humira subcutaneous kit (10 
mg/0.1 ml) is around $5,810.97 for 
a supply of 2 
$8,542 for 1 carton 
(2 pens) of Humira 
40mg/0.4ml 
Mvasi  
$716.71 for a supply of 4 
ml of intravenous solution 
(awwb 25 mg/ml)  
N/A 
Avastin intravenous solution (25 
mg/ml) is around $841.51 for a 
supply of 4 ml 
N/A 
Zirabev N/A N/A 
Avastin intravenous solution (25 
mg/ml) is around $841.51 for a 
supply of 4 ml 
N/A 
Retacrit 
Retacrit injectable solution 
(epbx 2000 units/ml 
preservative-free) is around 
$239.81 for a supply of 10 
ml 
$564.36 for 4 
vials (1ml) of 
Retacrit 10000 
units/ml 
Epogen injectable solution (2000 
units/ml preservative-free) is 
around $355.69 for a supply of 10 
ml 
$48.81 for 1 vial 
(1ml) of Epogen 
2000 units/ml 
Erelzi     
Enbrel subcutaneous kit 25 mg is 
around $2,910.22 for a supply of 4 
kits 
$8,389.15 for 1 
carton (4 sure 
clicks) of Enbrel 
50mg 
Eticovo     
Enbrel subcutaneous kit 25 mg is 
around $2,910.22 for a supply of 4 
kits 
$8,389.15 for 1 
carton (4 sure 
clicks) of Enbrel 
50mg 
  





Average Price on Drugs.com 
Average Price on 
GoodRX.com 
Average Price of Reference 
Product on Drugs.com 






Nivestym injectable solution 
(aafi 300 mcg/0.5 ml) is 
around $238.14 for a supply of 
0.5 ml 
  
$2,254.90 for 5 
syringes (0.8ml) of 
Nivestym 480mcg 
Neupogen injectable solution 
(300 mcg/ml) is around 
$3,296.36 for a supply of 10 ml 
or $357.88 for 0.5 ml at 
300mcg/0.5ml 






Zarxio injectable solution 
(sndz 300 mcg/0.5 ml) is 
around $295.93 for a supply of 
0.5 ml 
$1,652.01 for 5 
syringes (0.5ml) of 
Zarxio 300mcg 
Neupogen injectable solution 
(300 mcg/ml) is around 
$3,296.36 for a supply of 10 ml 





Renflexis intravenous powder 
for injection abda 100 mg is 
around $796.04 for a supply of 
1 powder for injection 
$4,520.54 for 5 
vials of Renflexis 
100mg 
Remicade intravenous powder 
for injection 100 mg is around 
$1,228.70 for a supply of 1 
powder for injection 
$5,736.81 for 4 
vials of Remicade 
100mg 
Avsola     
Remicade intravenous powder 
for injection 100 mg is around 
$1,228.70 for a supply of 1 
powder for injection 
$5,736.81 for 4 
vials of Remicade 
100mg 
Inflectra 
Inflectra intravenous powder 
for injection dyyb 100 mg is 
around $997.42 for a supply of 
1 powder for injection 
$4,554.50 for 4 
vials of Inflectra 
100mg 
Remicade intravenous powder 
for injection 100 mg is around 
$1,228.70 for a supply of 1 
powder for injection 
$5,736.81 for 4 
vials of Remicade 
100mg 
Ixifi     
Remicade intravenous powder 
for injection 100 mg is around 
$1,228.70 for a supply of 1 
powder for injection 
$5,736.81 for 4 




solution (bmez 6 mg/0.6 ml) is 
around $4,107.76 for a supply 
of 0.6 ml 
N/A 
Neulasta subcutaneous solution 
(6 mg/0.6 ml) is around 
$6,514.72 for a supply of 0.6 ml 






solution (cbqv 6 mg/0.6 ml) is 
around $4,368.20 for a supply 
of 0.6 ml 
$5,462.74 for 1 
syringe of Udenyca 
(6mg/0.6ml)  
  
Neulasta subcutaneous solution 
(6 mg/0.6 ml) is around 
$6,514.72 for a supply of 0.6 ml 






solution (jmdb 6 mg/0.6 ml) is 
around $4,368.20 for a supply 
of 0.6 ml 
$5,532.26 for 1 
syringe of Fulphilia 
(6mg/0.6ml) 
Neulasta subcutaneous solution 
(6 mg/0.6 ml) is around 
$6,514.72 for a supply of 0.6 ml 















Average Price of 
Reference Product on 
Drugs.com 





Truxima intravenous solution 
(abbs 10 mg/ml) is around 




solution (10 mg/ml) is 
around $990.36 for a 
supply of 10 ml 
N/A 
Ruxience N/A N/A 
Rituxan intravenous 
solution (10 mg/ml) is 
around $990.36 for a 




Kanjinti intravenous powder 
for injection anns 150 mg is 
around $1,388.05 for a 




powder for injection 150 
mg is around $1,636.49 




Ogivri intravenous powder 
for injection dkst 150 mg is 
around $1,392.44 for a 




powder for injection 150 
mg is around $1,636.49 
for a supply of 1 powder 
for injection 
N/A 
Ontruzant  N/A N/A 
Herceptin intravenous 
powder for injection 150 
mg is around $1,636.49 
for a supply of 1 powder 
for injection 
N/A 
Herzuma N/A N/A 
Herceptin intravenous 
powder for injection 150 
mg is around $1,636.49 
for a supply of 1 powder 
for injection 
N/A 
Trazimera N/A N/A 
Herceptin intravenous 
powder for injection 150 
mg is around $1,636.49 
















73 See Lauren Chase, A Guide to Biosimilar Prices: How Much They 



























































Cyltezo       12/31/2002 14.58   
Abrilada        12/31/2002 16.83   
Amjevita       12/31/2002 13.67   
Hadlima       12/31/2002 16.50   
Mvasi  10,161 14.83% 15% 2/26/2004 13.50 
13.50 15.33 2 2 
Zirabev 9,201 N/A 23% 2/26/2004 15.33 
Retacrit 992 32.58% 80% 6/1/1989 28.92 28.92 29.42 1 1 




Eticovo       11/2/1998 20.42   
  



































































Zarxio  549 30.32% 18% 8/24/1998 16.50 





18.25 4 2 
Avsola       8/24/1998 21.25 
Inflectra  
  
3,785 18.82% 19% 8/24/1998 17.58 
Ixifi       8/24/1998 19.25 
  

























































Ziextenzo 3,926 36.95% 37% 1/31/2002 17.75 
16.33 16.42 3 3 Udenyca  4,175 32.95% 33% 1/31/2002 16.75 
Fulphila  4,175 32.95% 33% 1/31/2002 16.33 
Truxima 2,198 9.91% 9% 11/26/1997 21.00 
21.00 21.92 2 2 
Ruxience 1,863 N/A 24% 11/26/1997 21.58 
Kanjinti  3,961 15.18% 15% 9/25/1998 20.67 
19.17 20.75 5 4 
Ogivri  3,974 14.91% 15% 9/25/1998 19.17 
Ontruzant        9/25/1998 20.25 
Herzuma 4,208 10% 10% 9/25/1998 20.17 
Trazimera 3,391 22% 27% 9/25/1998 20.42 
